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Abstract
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (“OCC”)
FinTech charter is an attempt by a U.S. financial regulator to
grapple with emerging technologies in financial services in a
meaningful way, and while this comment does not come to any
conclusions as to whether the OCC's framework is correct, this
comment does argue that the FinTech charter would enable
companies to circumvent the requirements of the Bank Holding
Company Act (“BHCA”).

Despite the OCC initially suggesting that

the BHCA could apply to FinTech companies chartered as special
purpose national banks (“SPNBs”), it is clear that these
entities do not and cannot meet the definition of a bank under
the BHCA because FinTech SPNBs are not permitted to take
deposits.

Furthermore, the industry that the charter is

actually targeting, marketplace lending, does not take deposits
and instead relies on other sources of funding.

Therefore, the

parent companies of FinTech SPNBs can offer financial services
and avail themselves of the rights and benefits of a national
bank without complying with the BHCA.

This comment argues that

FinTech SPNBs should be subject to the BHCA because an analysis
of marketplace lending reveals that including the industry in
the statutory definition of a bank would serve the BHCA’s
underlying policy rationales.
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I.

Introduction
From mobile banking and artificial intelligence to Big

Tech, technology is changing the way financial services are
reaching consumers, and U.S. financial regulators are struggling
to keep pace.

In 2016, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of

the Currency (“OCC”) attempted to bring financial innovations
under the federal regulatory regime by announcing the agency’s
exploration into special purpose national bank (“SPNB”) charters
for financial technology (“FinTech”) companies.1

The agency

proceeded with its proposal in 2018, announcing it would begin
accepting applications for such charters, publishing an update
to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual in July 2018. 2

1

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS

FOR

OF THE

CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE

FINTECH COMPANIES 2 (2016),

https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-andexamination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purposenat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf (introducing the idea of a FinTech
charter).
2

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING

MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES 1 (2018) (establishing that FinTech companies may be
eligible for a national bank charter and explaining how FinTech
charter applications might be evaluated).

1

The July 2018 Licensing Manual Supplement made clear that
the only FinTech companies who could apply for the charter were
those who did not take deposits.3

Yet the OCC’s white paper from

December 2016 suggested that the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 (“BHCA”) could apply to companies that own FinTech SPNBs if
the SPNB meets the definition of a bank under the statute. 4
However, in order to meet the definition of a bank under the
BHCA, the institution must either be FDIC-insured or take
deposits and make commercial loans.5

Because of the OCC’s own

requirement that depository institutions cannot apply for the

3

See id. at 2 (stating that the FinTech charter is intended only

for institutions that do not take deposits).
4

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 7 (“If

a fintech company interested in operating as a special purpose
national bank has or plans to have a holding company that would
be the sole or controlling owner of the bank . . . the BHCA
could apply.”).
5

See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (providing the seminal

definition of a bank under the BHCA as an institution that is
either FDIC-insured or both accepts deposits and makes
commercial loans).

2

FinTech charter, parent companies of FinTech SPNBs would be, by
definition, excluded from application of the BHCA. 6
To demonstrate this issue, imagine a hypothetical FinTech
company:

a marketplace lender, FastCash, Inc.

FastCash is a

large direct lender that relies on market funding to make loans
to its customers via its online website.

Customers need only

fill out an application online before receiving a credit
decision, which FastCash makes using its proprietary
underwriting algorithm.

FastCash only makes consumer loans;

that is, extensions of credit to a person rather than a
business.

To avoid the costly and burdensome state-by-state

licensing system, FastCash applies for and receives an SPNB
charter, thus entitling it to all the rights and benefits of a
federally-regulated national bank.
Imagine also a large technology and e-commerce company—
Abracadabra, Inc.—that offers a variety of services in addition

6

See Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech: The OCC’s Newest

Nonbank Proposal, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1393, 1426 (2018) (arguing
the OCC should not be allowed to charter non-depository
institutions because doing so would enable parent companies of
such institutions to avoid the BHCA).

3

to its e-commerce platform, including big data analytics.7

To

facilitate its e-commerce business and make use of its data
analytics arm, Abracadabra seeks to acquire FastCash to offer
lending services to its customers.

FastCash is not a bank for

the purposes of the BHCA because it neither accepts deposits nor
is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”).

Abracadabra can thus obtain the benefits of a

nationally-chartered entity without being subject to the BHCA.
The history of the BHCA tracks a game of cat-and-mouse, in
which industry players construct innovative business models to
avoid triggering the statute, while Congress attempts to
undercut opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by amending the
statutory text.8

7

If there is a loophole in the FinTech charter

See generally Dan Murphy, Big Tech’s Invasion of Banking, MILKEN

INST. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/bigtechs-invasion-of-banking (discussing the threat of Big Tech
companies seeking to enter the financial services industry),bh
8

See generally Saule T. Omarova & Tahyar E. Margaret, That Which

We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company
Regulations in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113
(2012) (providing a detailed history of the development of the
BHCA and the changing definition of a bank as a result of
industry exploiting loopholes).

4

that undermines the underlying policy objectives of the BHCA,
then undoubtedly FinTech SPNBs should also be tethered to the
BHCA’s requirements like other FDIC-insured national banks.9

If,

however, applying the BHCA to the parent companies of FinTech
SPNBs would not serve any underlying policy objective, then
there is no legal conundrum.10

Ultimately, whether the BHCA

should apply to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs is a
question of the extent to which it would serve the statute’s
underlying policy rationales.
The question that this comment seeks to answer is:

should

the BHCA apply to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs?
Through the lens of the marketplace lending industry, this
comment argues that subjecting the parent companies of FinTech
SPNBs would serve the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales and,
therefore, the BHCA should apply.

This comment also proposes a

framework by which to analyze the applicability of the BHCA.

9

See id. at 159–68 (exemplifying how an exemption from the BHCA

precipitated the rapid growth of the industrial loan company
industry).
10

See id. at 172 (explaining that credit card banks were first

implicitly, and then explicitly, exempted from the definition of
a bank under the BHCA because there was no interstate banking
risk or monopolization of commercial credit risk).

5

Section II of this comment provides an introduction to the OCC
FinTech charter, the marketplace lending industry, and the BHCA.
Section III proposes a framework to analyze the BHCA’s
applicability and applies that framework to our hypothetical
marketplace lender, FastCash.

Section IV recommends a solution

in the form of a statutory amendment from Congress that would
incorporate FinTech SPNBs in the definition of a bank.
II.

The FinTech Charter and the BHCA
FinTech is difficult to define and there is no universally-

accepted definition.11

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines

FinTech as “products and companies that employ newly developed
digital and online technologies in the banking and financial
services industries.”12

The types of technologies are broad and

include products such as marketplace lending, mobile banking,
mobile payments, crowdfunding, cryptocurrency, automated

11

See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edges, 93

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 78-9 (2018) (advocating for a broad
definition of financial technology).
12

Fintech, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/fintech (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).

6

investing, and other digitized assets and services.13

The rise

of FinTech, particularly marketplace lending, accelerated
following the financial crisis of 2008, when access to lines of
credit dried up and made it exceedingly difficult for consumers
and small businesses to obtain short-term, small-dollar loans.14
Consequently, the FinTech industry is generally seen as a
product of the growing 21st-century digital economy, and a new
challenge for financial regulators tasked with ensuring the
safety and soundness of the markets and their participants.15

In

2018, the OCC attempted to provide greater regulatory clarity

13

See, e.g., Jackson Mueller, Bipartisan Opportunities to

Legislate U.S. FinTech in the 21 st Century, MILKEN INSTITUTE 9
(2018) (tabulating the various sectors of the financial
technology industry).
14

See DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING:

FINTECH

IN

CONSUMER

AND

SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING 1 (2018) (discussing the

rapid growth of the marketplace lending industry); see also
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation
Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 268 (analyzing how online lenders
have filled the gaps in access to credit).
15

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing FinTech as a new

development in market trends); see id. at 26 (noting FinTech
presents regulatory challenges).

7

for FinTech companies that pay checks or make loans, but do not
take deposits, in the form of a proposed FinTech charter.16
A.

Introducing the OCC FinTech Charter

The FinTech charter was the result of a long-term multistakeholder effort beginning in August 2015 to study financial
innovation and develop an appropriate regulatory framework. 17

In

March 2016, the agency capitalized on its work by publishing its
first white paper on the principles of regulating financial
innovation.18

A few months later, the OCC established the Office

of Innovation and, not long after, announced in December 2016
that it would begin exploring SPNB charters for FinTech

16

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, OCC BEGINS ACCEPTING

NATIONAL BANK CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (July
31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html (announcing the agency would
begin accepting applications for national bank charters from
FinTech companies).
17

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 3

(summarizing the progress of the OCC’s innovation initiative).
18

See id. (highlighting the white paper released in March 2016

in which the OCC discussed regulation of financial innovation,
including FinTech).

8

companies.19

In the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual Supplement,

the agency defines an SPNB as “a national bank that engages in a
limited range of banking or fiduciary activities . . . .”20

In

the case of the FinTech charter, these activities are limited
paying checks or lending money.21
According to the OCC, an SPNB charter for FinTech would:
(1) “provide[] a framework of uniform standards”; (2) “level the
playing field with regulated institutions”; and (3) “help
promote consistency in the application of laws and regulations
across the country . . . .”22

The FinTech charter provides a

nationalized solution to the current state-by-state licensing

19

See id. at 2–3 (summarizing the agency’s findings and

discussing the creation and establishment of the OCC’s Office of
Innovation).
20

OFFICE

21

See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2015) (“A special purpose bank

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2.

that conducts activities other than fiduciary activities must
conduct at least one of the following three core banking
functions:

Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending

money.”).
22

OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY

CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT

TO

APPLY

(2018).

9

FOR

ON

FINANCIAL

NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS 2

system.23

The present regulatory framework can be quite

burdensome for FinTech companies, particularly marketplace
lenders, who are required to comply with the varying, and
sometimes conflicting, state licensing requirements.24

The OCC

aimed to provide greater certainty and clarity for the industry
through the creation of FinTech SPNBs that have the same rights
and requirements as national banks.25

According to the OCC, a

FinTech company chartered as an SPNB has the same rights as any
other chartered national bank.26

This special status affords

SPNBs certain benefits, notably federal preemption under the
National Bank Act and the OCC’s regulations.27

23

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining how fintech

companies are regulated at the state level).
24

See id. at 15 (discussing the various state licensing

requirements and which companies or industries are required to
obtain licenses).
25

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (“In

general, a special purpose national bank is subject to the same
laws, regulations, examination, reporting requirements, and
ongoing supervision as other national banks.”).
26

See id. (describing further the benefits that a FinTech SPNB

can obtain by virtue of becoming a chartered national bank).
27

See id. (discussing the dual-banking preemption system.

10

The FinTech charter has been caught up in litigation since
2016, when the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) and
New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) first
filed lawsuits challenging the charter. 28

While the CSBS case

was dismissed for lack of ripeness, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York entered judgment in October
2019 in favor of NYDFS, effectively blocking the OCC from
issuing any charters to FinTech companies.29

The OCC appealed

the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

28

See Complaint at 5, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v.

OCC, 313 F.Supp.3d 285 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17 Civ. 0763) (brining
a suit against the OCC for declaratory and injunctive relief
preventing the OCC from chartering FinTech companies); see also
Complaint at 1, Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574, 2017 WL 6512245,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief challenging the OCC SPNB charter for FinTech
companies).
29

See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, No. 18 Civ.

2449, 2019 WL 4194541, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (dismissing
the case for lack of ripeness); see also Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18
Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019)
(vacating the OCC’s regulation permitting it to charter nondepository institutions).

11

and, as of April 2020, the case is pending.30

Nonetheless,

interest in the FinTech charter remains high, particularly among
the industry that would stand to benefit the most from a
national regulatory regime:

30

marketplace lenders.31

See Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL

6334895, at *1 (appealing the decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York) ; see also Lacewell
v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2d Cir. filed Dec. 19, 2019) (filing the
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit);
see also UNITED STATES COURT

OF

APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT (Mar. 26,

2020), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ (extending all filing
deadlines by 21 days beginning April 6, 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic).
31

See Kate Rooney, Fintech’s Fast Pass to Traditional Banking is

Now Cut Off, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/fintechs-fast-pass-totraditional-banking-is-now-cut-off.html (pointing out that
FinTech companies were very interested in the OCC charter).

But

see Zach A. Pette, It's Harder for Fintechs to Become Banks. And
That's Good., PAYMENTSSOURCE (Mar. 26, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/its-harder-for-fintechsto-become-banks-and-thats-good (arguing against a national bank

12

B.

Marketplace Lending

In simple terms, a marketplace lender is non-banking entity
that makes loans to consumers and businesses via an online
platform.32

Customers apply for a loan, typically via the

marketplace lender’s website, provide access to their bank and
other accounts, and receive a credit decision almost
immediately.33

The process is expedited through the use of

machine learning and artificial intelligence (“AI”) to assess
alternative, nontraditional data, enabling the program to

charter for FinTech companies but noting many companies,
including Varo and Square, are eager to obtain the benefits of a
national bank charter).
32

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 1–2 (describing the central

features of marketplace lenders).
33

See HOW DOES

AN

ONLINE CREDIT MARKETPLACE WORK?, LENDINGCLUB,

https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (describing LendingClub’s online
credit application and securitization); see also HOW IT WORKS,
ONDECK, https://www.ondeck.com/how-it-works (last visited Apr.
12, 2020) (summarizing OnDeck’s credit application process for
potential customers).

13

generate a credit decision within minutes. 34

The platform’s use

of alternative data make marketplace lenders particularly
accessible to unbanked and underbanked customers who are often
unable to obtain credit from chartered institutions that use
more traditional data.35

The growth of the industry is further

evidence of the popularity of marketplace lenders, who saw a
global increase in credit originations from $11 billion in 2013
to $284 billion in 2016.36

In 2019, two of the largest industry

players in the United States, LendingClub and OnDeck, originated
almost $15 billion of loans combined.37

34

See Kristin Johnson et al., Symposium: Rise of the Machines:

Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law:
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance:
Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 500 (2019)
(explaining how FinTech lenders use machine learning and AI).
35

See id. at 528 (discussing the benefits of AI).

36

Stijn Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the

World: Size, Drivers and Policy Issues, BIS Q. REV. 33 (2018).
37

See LendingClub, Form 10-K Annual Report 58 (Feb. 19, 2020)

(reporting $12.3 billion in loan originations in 2019); see also
OnDeck, Form 10-K Annual Report 4 (Feb. 28, 2020) (reporting
$2.5 billion in loan originations in 2019).

14

There are two primary business models by which the
marketplace lender can extend credit:

(1) the direct lending

model; and (2) the bank partnership model.38

Under either model,

the marketplace lender does not take deposits and instead relies
on the market or its bank partner to fund the loan. 39

In the

direct lending model, the marketplace lender holds the loans on
its balance sheet and incurs all the credit risk if a borrower
defaults.40

Direct marketplace lenders generally have to obtain

a license for every state in which they want to do business,
which can discourage companies from pursuing the direct lending
model.41

38

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 2–3 (describing the marketplace

lending business models and noting that the direct lending model
is also referred to as the balance-sheet lending model); see
also U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE

TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH,

AND

INNOVATION 87–88

(2018) (discussing the lending models).
39

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 11 (noting marketplace lenders

do not rely on deposits).
40

See id. at 3 (describing the direct lending model, which is

also referred to as the balance-sheet lending model).
41

See U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE

TREASURY, supra note 38, at 87–88

(discussing the direct lending model).

15

In the bank partnership model, the marketplace lender
relies on a state- or nationally-chartered bank to originate the
loan, which the marketplace lender then buys back and services
for the borrower.42

Another version of this model, referred to

as “peer-to-peer” or “P2P” lending, connects prospective
investors with loans that match their risk tolerance and desired
rate of return.43

Once a match is made and the investor has

committed to funding the loan, the partner bank originates the
loan and sells it to the marketplace lender, who in turn sells
the loan to investors in the form of a note. 44
The bank partnership model is often referred to as a “renta-charter” or “rent-a-bank” scheme because the marketplace

42

See id. at 88 (discussing the bank partnership model); see

also Perkins, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining how the bank
partnership model functions).
43

See U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE

TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88

(discussing the P2P lending model); see also Perkins, supra note
14, at 4 (illustrating the P2P lending model).
44

See U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE

TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88

(detailing the funding strategy in the peer-to-peer funding
model); see also Perkins, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining the
securitization process in the peer-to-peer lending model, also
known as the indirect funding model).

16

lender pays the partner bank to originate the loan and, in
exchange, obtains the same legal protections and preemption
benefits afforded to that institution for that loan.45

This

model can be particularly beneficial for a marketplace lender
seeking to avoid state usury caps because, under Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,46
the loan originated by the partner bank is valid so long as it
complies with the usury laws of the state in which the bank is
located.

However, a Second Circuit decision from 2015

eviscerated this arrangement by holding that third-party debt
buyers cannot avail themselves of the partner bank’s federal
preemption of state usury caps.47

45

Consequently, the benefits of

See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining the legal

challenges that rent-a-charter schemes face, particularly when
considering who the true lender is).
46

439 U.S. 299, 313 (1978) (holding that a bank may charge its

out-of-state customers the interest that is permissible in the
state where the bank is located).
47

See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2015)

(holding that third-party debt buyer partners of national banks
cannot preempt state usury caps under the National bank Act).

17

the “rent-a-charter” structure are waning, making the OCC’s
FinTech charter all the more appealing.48
C.

The Bank Holding Company Act:

A History of a Statute

Under Siege
The BHCA regulates the parent companies of entities that
meet the definition of a bank under the statute. 49

These bank

holding companies (“BHCs”) are subject to enhanced regulation
and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(“Board”).50

Specifically, there are a number of requirements

that a company must meet before becoming a BHC, such as
requesting pre-approval by the Board before acquiring any bank
or any additional bank.51

48

The Board also restricts the

See Joseph B. Sconyers et al., OCC Fintech Charter Headed to

the Second Circuit, JONES DAY (Jan. 2020),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/01/occ-fintechcharter-headed-to-the-second-circuit (contending that the Second
Circuit’s decision in Madden v. Midland “raised existential
questions” for fintech companies and made the prospect of a
national bank charter more appealing).
49

12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2018).

50

See id. § 1844 (requiring BHCs to register with the Board and

authorizing the Board to regulate BHCs).
51

Id. §§ 1842(a), 1843(j)(1), (4), (5).

18

permissible activities of the non-banking subsidiaries of BHCs
to those that are “so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto . . . .” 52
The BHCA was initially enacted for two primary and
interrelated purposes:

(1) to prevent the monopolization of

commercial credit; and (2) to restrict the interstate expansion
of bank branches.53

The enactment of the groundbreaking

legislation was the result of an uptick in banks forming BHCs as
a means to subvert state banking regulations restricting
interstate branching.54

The drafters of the BHCA feared this

trend would lead to the rise of a “national banking empire.”55
Nonetheless, following the BHCA’s passage in 1956, the policy
focus shifted from the two above rationales to the separation of

52

12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2019).

53

See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2–7 (1955) (outlining the reasons

for the BHCA, including combatting the growing number of BHCs
seeking to take advantage of out-of-state markets); see also
Omarova, supra note 8, at 119 (summarizing the two underlying
rationales for the BHCA).
54

See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 4 (detailing the expansion of BHCs

across state lines).
55

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 120 (citing Note, The Bank

Holding Company Act of 1956, 75 BANKING L.J. 277, 293 (1958)).

19

banking and commerce, reflecting concerns about banks becoming
too immersed in non-banking activities.56

The three policies for

the BHCA that Congress put forth can be summarized as:

(1)

restricting interstate banking; (2) preventing the
monopolization of commercial credit; and (3) separating banking
and commerce.
i.

The Evolving Definition of a “Bank” Under the

BCHA
Whether an entity qualifies as a bank under the BHCA
determines the statute’s applicability.

A company that acquires

a nonbank entity will not be subject to the requirements of the
BHCA or heightened regulation by the Board. 57

The definition of

a bank under the BHCA is the product of numerous amendments
between 1956, when the statute was enacted, and 1987, when the
definition of a bank was most recently amended. 58

Congress

acknowledged that the BHCA as originally enacted was not

56

See id. at 124 (demonstrating the shift in focus to the

separation of banking and commerce).
57

12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018).

58

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 138–39 (noting that Congress

amended the definition of a bank under the BHCA three times).

20

intended to contemplate all the issues and risks posed by BHCs. 59
Yet, because the statute was not comprehensive, this gave rise
to loopholes.60

As the BHCA’s legislative history demonstrates,

for every amendment to the statute, there was a corresponding
increase in institutions seeking to take advantage of newlycreated loopholes.61
The 1966 Amendments to the BHCA redefined a bank as “any
institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand . . . .” 62

Congress narrowed the

original 1956 definition realizing that restricting the
application of the BHCA to depository institutions could still
serve the underlying objective of restraining the concentration
of commercial credit.63

Congress viewed it as unnecessary to

apply the BHCA to companies that owned savings banks and thus

59

See H.R. REP. NO. 89-534, at 3 (1965) (stating the BHCA was not

intended to anticipate all possible problems).
60

See id. at 3–4 (closing the loophole for trusts).

61

See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 8, at 151–52 (discussing the

growing number of acquisitions of nonbank banks in the 1980s,
exploiting a loophole in an older version of the BHCA).
62

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-

485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236, 236 (1966).
63

S. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).
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applied the statute only to institutions that accepted demand
deposits.64

However, the 1966 Amendments enabled holding

companies to sidestep the requirements of the BHCA by ensuring
that the institutions under their control did not accept what
would legally be considered demand deposits. 65
In 1970, Congress again amended the definition of a bank to
“any institution . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2)
engages in the business of making commercial loans.” 66

The 1970

definition of a bank restricted the BHCA’s application to only
those institutions engaged in commercial and not consumer

64

See id. (providing that the “commonly accepted test” for

whether an institution is a commercial bank is whether it
accepts demand deposits).
65

See id. (maintaining that the 1966 Amendments opened the door

to holding companies that could control both commercial and de
facto banking subsidiaries so long as these entities did not
take demand deposits).
66

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970).
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lending.67

This change, in effect, allowed any company to obtain

control of an FDIC-insured institution that both accepted
deposits and made consumer loans without implicating the BHCA.68
This so-called “nonbank bank” loophole rapidly proliferated
given that companies could own banks without being subject to
the restrictions of the BHCA.69
Viewing this trend as a major threat to the separation of
banking and commerce, Congress closed the nonbank bank loophole
in the Competitive Equality Banking Act (“CEBA”) of 1987 by
amending the definition of a bank to its current version:
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. (B) An institution . .
. which both—(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits
that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar
means for payment to third parties or others; and (ii)

67

See S. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 24 (discussing the Board’s concerns

that the 1966 Amendments made the definition of a bank too
broad).
68

See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 2 (1987) (discussing the rise of the

nonbank bank loophole).
69

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 150 (expanding upon the creation

of the nonbank bank loophole).
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is engaged in the business of making commercial
loans.70
CEBA also included a number of exceptions from the
definition of a bank, specifically excluding foreign banks,
trust banks, credit unions, credit card banks, industrial loan
companies (ILCs), and savings banks. 71

The exceptions to the

definition of a bank under the BHCA shed light on the statute’s
underlying policy rationales, providing some guidance as to when
Congress will apply the BHCA to a particular type of entity.
ii.

The BHCA’s Policy Rationales

Prior to the BHCA’s enactment in 1956 and in order to
protect small community banks, a number of states imposed
restrictions on banks’ abilities to expand across state
borders.72

In response, several entities began to form BHCs

because it enabled them to own banks from different states while

70

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86,

§ 101(a), 101 Stat. 552, 554 (1987); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)
(2018).
71

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 101(a); 12 U.S.C. §

1841(c)(2).
72

See Omarova, supra note 7, at 120–21 (discussing the

interstate banking rationale).
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avoiding restrictions on interstate banking. 73

States and local

bankers grew concerned that the growing number of BHCs
threatened the ability of community banks to operate in the
commercial credit market.74

The BHCA was thus born from the two

harmonious policy rationales of (1) restricting interstate
banking and (2) preventing excessive concentration of commercial
credit.75

Nevertheless, market and economic realities made these

two objectives less feasible.76

Interstate banking restrictions

simply fell out of favor while resistance to the monopolization
of commercial credit faded as more banks consolidated and merged
with each other “in search for . . . economies of scale . . .
.”77

Instead, policymakers grew more concerned with the

intermingling of banking and commerce. 78
Separating banking and commerce has been a long-standing
principle of U.S. financial regulation, and it has evolved over

73

Id. at 121.

74

Id. at 122.

75

Id. at 120.

76

Id. at 123 n.33.

77

Id. at 123–24.

78

Id. at 124.
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time.79

Beginning in the 1860s, the National Bank Act of 1864

provided for a limited set of core banking powers. 80

The

separation of banking and commerce was then formally codified
into law with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which limited the
activities that banks could engage in, specifically prohibiting
banks from dealing in or underwriting securities.81

However,

banks were still permitted to affiliate with purely commercial
firms.82

79

The most meaningful change came in 1956 with the BHCA,

See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J.

710, 794 (2017) (noting the historical significance of the
separation of banking and commerce in banking law).

See

generally Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481 (providing a history of
the separation of banking and commerce in the United States).
80

See Halpert, supra note 79, at 492 (noting the powers granted

to banks by the National Bank Act were limited in scope).
81

See WILLIAM JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 87-352 E, THE SEPARATION

OF

BANKING

AND

COMMERCE 4 (1987) (discussing the purpose and

enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act).
82

Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking,

Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 274 (2013).
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which finally imposed restrictions on the activities of bank
affiliates.83
There are three main arguments in favor of maintaining the
separation between banking and commerce:

“the needs to preserve

the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to
ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive
economic enterprise, and to prevent excessive concentration of
financial and economic power in the financial sector.” 84

The

safety and soundness argument has to do with the bank’s exposure
to risky nonbanking activities as both banks and the deposit
insurance fund (for depository banks) should not be used to
prop-up failing commercial affiliates.85

The second argument

pertains to bias in credit underwriting, as banks affiliated
with commercial firms may be strongly incentivized “to make
important lending decisions on the basis of such decisions’
potential impact on their commercial affiliates’ financial

83

Id.

84

Id. at 275.

85

See id. at 275–76 (discussing the problems with allowing

commercial businesses to benefit from the deposit insurance fund
through their bank affiliates).
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condition or profitability.”86

Lastly, the third prong relates

to the potential for banks and commercial firms to merge and
form large financial conglomerates to the exclusion of small
businesses and businesses not affiliated with a bank. 87
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”), which both partially repealed Glass-Steagall and
created a new financial entity:
(“FHC”).88

the financial holding company

FHCs are able to engage in a broader range of

activities that are “financial in nature” or determined to be
“complementary” to a financial activity.89

While the GLBA did

not outright repeal the separation of banking and commerce, it
did make it significantly easier for companies to own a bank
while also owning other nonbank entities. 90

86

Id. at 276.

See also S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 8 (1987) (quoting

Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker).
87

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276–77.

88

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338,

1341 (1999); see also Omarova, supra note 82, at 279 (discussing
the GLBA).
89

12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2018).

90

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 126 (contending that the

principle of the separation of banking and commerce was retained
before the GLBA was enacted).
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III. Analyzing the FinTech Charter and the Applicability of the
BHCA
The OCC FinTech charter specifically requires that
marketplace lenders not take deposits, yet allows them to avail
themselves of all the rights and benefits of becoming a national
bank.91

Because of this, the FinTech charter is highly desirable

for marketplace lenders seeking greater regulatory clarity and
certainty, particularly because of the federal preemption
benefits.92

Throughout the history of the BHCA, numerous

entities have sought to take advantage of the BHC structure
without triggering the statute and thus being subject to

91

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2

(stating that depository institutions would not qualify for the
FinTech charter); see also OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY,

supra note 1, at 5 (stating that SPNBs are subject to the same
laws and standards as chartered national banks); see also id.
(establishing the a FinTech SPNB would have the same rights as
any other nationally-chartered bank).
92

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5

(noting that SPNBs would be able to avail themselves of the
preemption benefits available to chartered national banks under
the National Bank Act and the OCC’s regulations).
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enhanced regulation by the Board.93

This demonstrates that the

BHC structure itself is highly desirable as it enables companies
to consolidate.94

But, as the BHCA is currently written, it

would not apply to the parent company of a marketplace lender
because the marketplace lender would not meet the statutory
definition of a bank.95

An analysis of the BHCA’s explicit and

implicit underlying policy rationales demonstrates that the BHCA

93

See generally Omarova, supra note 7 (providing a history of

the definition of a bank under the BHCA, which evolved in
response to companies seeking to become BHCs without being
regulated as such under the statute).
94

See id. at 123–24 (discussing the trend among banks and their

holding companies to merge, acquire, and consolidate in order to
take advantage of the benefits that a large financial
conglomerate has to offer).
95

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 38 (noting marketplace lenders

do not take deposits and instead rely on other sources of
funding); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (defining a
bank as an institution that takes demand deposits, including
FDIC-insured institutions).
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should apply to the parent companies of chartered FinTech SPNBs
because doing so would serve those rationales. 96
A.

Proposing a BHCA Analysis Framework

Let us return to the case of FastCash, Inc., our
hypothetical marketplace lender that is now a charted SPNB.
Recall that Abracadabra, Inc., a technology and e-commerce
company, is seeking to acquire FastCash in order to offer
lending services to its customers and, in doing so, it would not
be subject to the requirements under the BHCA.

But, should it

be?
The underlying rationales for the BHCA helped guide
Congress when determining whether an entity should be considered
a bank under the statute.97

These policy rationales can be used

as a framework to analyze whether companies like Abracadabra
should be subject to the requirements of the BHCA by including
marketplace lenders, such as FastCash, in the definition of a

96

See generally Omarova, supra note 8 (discussing the changing

definition of a bank under the BHCA pursuant to the underlying
policy rationales).
97

See generally id. (providing a history of the evolution of the

BHCA due to the underlying policy rationales).
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bank.98

The first part of the analysis framework encompasses the

three explicit underlying policy rationales that emerged
throughout the history of the BHCA: (1) restricting interstate
banking; (2) preventing the monopolization of commercial credit;
and (3) separating banking and commerce.99

The second part of

the analysis framework proposes three new rationales that were
implicit in the policy decisions underlying the BHCA’ definition
of a bank:

(1) the availability of a parallel regulatory

regime; (2) access to the federal safety net; and (3) mitigating
too-big-to-fail institutions.100

98

See generally id. (demonstrating how Congress created the

definition of a bank and the exemptions from the definition of a
bank based on whether doing so served the underlying policy
rationales).
99

See id. at 119 (commercial credit and the separation of

banking and commerce); see also id. (expansion of interstate
banking).
100

See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); see also id. at

151–52 (pointing out that commercial companies who acquire banks
also acquire cheap funding from the bank’s depositors because
the deposits are insured by the federal government); see also
id. at 127 (discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
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i.

Framework Part I:

Explicit Rationales for the

BHCA
Over time, restricting interstate banking and preventing
the excessive concentration of commercial credit faded away as
the primary policy objectives of the BHCA because the economic
realities of the financial industry had changed. 101

Congress

ultimately repealed the restrictions on interstate banking under
the BHCA in 1994, finding the provision no longer useful. 102

In

1987, CEBA further eroded the restrictions against interstate
banking by codifying an explicit federal preemption of state
interstate banking laws.103

However, preventing the excessive

concentration of commercial credit remains a viable, though not

Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, nonbank systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) are regulated
similarly to BHCs).
101

See id. at 122–23 (examining how these two rationales became

less relevant).
102

See id. at 123 n.33 (discussing the development and eventual

repeal of the Douglas Amendment and explaining why the
restrictions on interstate banking fell out of favor).
103

See H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 172 (1987) (Conf. Rep.)

(explaining the rationale for preempting state laws restricting
interstate banking as important for bank acquisitions).
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central, objective of the BHCA.104

This is seen in the

definition of a bank in the statute itself, which includes
entities that take demand deposits and make commercial loans,
demonstrating a focus on commercial credit as opposed to
consumer credit.105

In addition, CEBA created an exemption from

the definition of a bank for trust companies, but specifically
restricted them from making commercial loans.106

Although

restricting interstate banking is not as essential when
balancing the various policy rationales supporting the
applicability of the BHCA, preventing the excessive
concentration of commercial credit remains relevant.107

104

See generally id. (retaining provisions of the BHCA that

protect against the monopolization of commercial credit).
105

See id. at 119–20 (closing the nonbank bank loophole but

maintaining commercial loans as a key feature of a bank); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (current statutory definition
of a bank).
106

H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 120 (1987) (Conf. Rep.).

107

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 172 (noting CEBA also exempted

credit card banks from the statutory definition of a bank
because these entities were not engaged in commercial lending);
see also id. at 178 (discussing the credit union exemption,

34

The importance of these latter two policy rationales pales
in comparison to the third policy rationale:
and commerce.108

separating banking

Recall the three reasons Congress chose to

separate banking and commerce:

(1) ensuring banks’ safety and

soundness by restricting affiliations with risky, purelycommercial businesses; (2) preventing bias in credit decisions

which was also justified on the basis that credit unions did not
impact the commercial credit market); see also id. at 190
(emphasizing Congress’ concerns about the excessive
concentration of commercial credit).
108

See generally Omarova, supra note 82 (providing a thorough

discussion of the history and importance of separating banking
and commerce in U.S. financial regulation and providing recent
examples that demonstrate the conflicts of interest that arise
from allowing financial institutions to deal in commodities);
see generally Khan, supra note 79 (analogizing the separation of
banking and commerce as a kind of antitrust principle and
explaining why Amazon poses similar risks to the economy as
banks who affiliate with purely commercial businesses); see
generally Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and
Commerce, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 973 (2019) (emphasizing the
importance of “separation regimes” in other industries,
including banking).
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causing banks to prop-up their failing commercial affiliates to
the detriment of other potential borrowers; and (3) discouraging
the formation of large financial conglomerates.109

While these

reasons illuminate why the separation of banking and commerce is
a priority, the history of the BHCA also demonstrates how that
separation is continuously undermined by firms seeking to
exploit loopholes and gain the benefits of owning a bank.110
ILCs, one of the entities excepted from the definition of a
bank, are a good example of what happens when an entity is
exempt from application of the BHCA. 111

In 2005, there was

significant controversy when Wal-Mart attempted to form its own
ILC in order to offer financial services to its customers. 112
Realizing the implications for the separation of banking and
commerce, the FDIC subsequently imposed a moratorium on WalMart’s application for deposit insurance as well as all other

109

Omarova, supra note 82, at 275–76.

110

See Jackson, supra note 81, at 13–14 (discussing the benefits

of allowing banks to diversify by affiliating with commercial
businesses).
111

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 160 (discussing the ILC

exception to the definition of a bank under the BHCA).
112

See id. at 167–69 (providing a history of Wal-Mart’s attempt

to obtain an ILC).
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applications by commercial firms seeking ILCs.113

Despite this,

ILCs continue to benefit from exemption status under the BHCA,
and the popularity of an ILC charter has not abated. 114

Some

have speculated that Big Tech companies, such as Google, Amazon,
and Apple, will apply for an ILC charter sometime soon, posing a
direct threat to the separation of banking and commerce.115

113

See id. at 168 (discussing the FDIC’s moratorium on Wal-

Mart’s application for deposit insurance and the related
fallout).

See also Scott Coleman & James Kim, FDIC Issues

Proposed Rule for Approval of ILC Deposit Insurance
Applications, JD SUPRA (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fdic-issues-proposed-rule-forapproval-86042/ (discussing the process by which ILCs apply for
a charter under the relevant state authorities and subsequently
apply for deposit insurance from the FDIC).
114

See generally DAVID W. PERKINS,

INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES

AND

FINTECH

IN

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11374,
BANKING (2019) (analyzing the

increasing popularity of ILC charters among technology companies
and the implications for the separation of banking and
commerce).
115

See id. at 2 (“[O]bservers have speculated that technology

giants such as Google, Amazon, and Apple might have reason to
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Congress appears to have legitimate reasons for wanting
separate banking and commerce, despite disagreement among legal
scholars, policymakers, and regulators as to whether doing so is
still a worthwhile goal.116

In reality, these threats create

want a bank charter, possibly including an ILC, in the near
future.”).
116

Compare Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of

Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 400–401 (2012)
(arguing financial regulators should adjust to the current
structure of the market rather than pushing for the separation
of banking and commerce), and Fischel et al., The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 322 (1987)
(highlighting the benefits of allowing banks to diversify their
assets), and Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating
Banking and Commerce?, AM. BANKER (Jul. 27, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-are-we-stillseparating-banking-and-commerce (explaining that enabling banks
to affiliate with nonbank entities can have certain benefits,
such as diversification, enhanced risk tolerance, increased
efficiency, and opportunities for capital expansion), with
Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under
the Bank Holding Company Act -- A Statutory Objective Under
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significant conflicts of interest.117

A recent example from the

early 2010s in which Goldman Sachs utilized its commodities and
derivatives businesses to profit from its own manipulation of
aluminum prices underscores the importance of maintaining the
separation between banking and commerce even in modern times. 118
Returning to our hypothetical marketplace lender, FastCash, and
Abracadabra, such an acquisition mirrors the more recent trend
of Big Tech entering financial services; thus, the separation of

Attack, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 184 (1983) (contending that the
separation of banking and commerce should be strengthened as “an
essential ingredient of a sound banking system” and to suppress
the rise of nonbank banks).
117

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276 (listing the potential

conflicts of interest that would arise from an intermingling of
banking and commerce); see also Khan, supra note 108, at 1053
(stating bias as the drive behind separating banking and
commerce).
118

See generally Omarova, supra note 82 (providing a detailed

history analysis of Goldman Sachs’ commodities business and the
consequences).
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banking and commerce should factor heavily into the analysis
framework.119
ii. Framework Part II:

Proposed Rationales

As the BHCA evolved, new policy rationales determining the
statute’s applicability emerged as both the market and
regulatory environment changed, particularly following the
financial crisis of 2008.120

The earliest exemptions to the

definition of a bank under the BHCA were carved out for credit
unions and savings and loan associations, or “thrifts.” 121
Congress did not view these entities as banks for the purposes
of the BHCA, so the companies that own them need not abide by
the statute’s requirements or apply for approval by the Board. 122

119

See BIS, ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 2019 31 (2019) (noting the trend

among Big Tech companies, including e-commerce platforms, to
offer lending services to their customers).
120

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 190 (tracking the changing

policy rationales for the BHCA since CEBA in response to the
financial crisis and the enactment of Dodd-Frank).
121

See id. at 174 (discussing the credit union exemption); see

also id. at 179 (discussing the exemption for savings
associations).
122

See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (codifying the exemptions to the

definition of bank in the BHCA).
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Though not explicitly stated, the rationale for these exemptions
was, in part, due to the existence of a parallel regulatory
regime.123

Credit unions are regulated and supervised by the

National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), and thrift
holding companies are regulated by the OCC (though, when the
exemption was created, thrift holding companies were regulated
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)).124

When

considering whether our hypothetical marketplace lender,
FastCash, should fall under the definition of a bank under the
BHCA, we may also consider whether it is subject to a parallel
federal regulatory regime.125
Another implicit rationale for the applicability of the
BHCA has to do with access to the federal safety net, i.e.,

123

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 178 (parallel regulatory regime

for credit unions); see also id. at 190 (parallel regulatory
regime for thrifts).
124

See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the

regulatory regime for thrifts by dissolving OTS and transferring
authority to the OCC).
125

See id. at 190 (discussing the importance of the policy

rationales, including the existence of a parallel regulatory
regime, to determining whether an entity should be subject to
the requirements of the BHCA).
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deposit insurance.126

This rationale can be thought of as an

offshoot of the separation of banking and commerce. 127
Policymakers supported separating banking and commerce out of
concerns that access to deposit insurance by commercial
businesses would give them an unfair competitive advantage over
businesses that have not acquired a deposit-taking bank.128

126

Part

See id. at 152 n.146 (elaborating on the vulnerability of the

federal safety net if purely commercial businesses were allowed
to affiliate with banks).
127

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 275–76 (expanding upon the

risks posed to the deposit insurance fund by purely commercial
businesses in the context of discussing underlying reasons for
separating banking and commerce).
128

See Jackson, supra note 81, at 14 (making the case against

allowing the intermingling of banking and commerce because
giving businesses access to cheap funding and “not funds
obtained at higher competitive costs in less-regulated capital
and credit markets” is generally anti-competitive); see also S.
REP. NO. 100-19, at 7 (1987) (reporting that failing to close the
nonbank bank loophole would undermine the separation of banking
and commerce and undermine market competition); see also id. at
8 (“The nonbank bank loophole allows commercial firms that own
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of the reason for closing the nonbank bank loophole in 1987 was
to prevent “direct access to federally-insured retail deposits
that served as a cheaper source of financing because of the
public subsidy.”129

While access to such valuable funding is

permissible for banks, who provide a public service, it is less
necessary for commercial firms who are expected to rely on
market forces for both funding and competition. 130

We may also

ask, therefore, whether our marketplace lender FastCash has
access to the federal safety net such that it would give
Abracadabra an unfair competitive advantage over other
commercial firms.131
Lastly, a more recent rationale has emerged following the
financial crisis of 2008 and enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall

nonbanks to gain an unfair competitive advantage over bank
holding companies and over commercial firms that do not have
captive nonbank banks.”).
129

Omarova, supra note 8, at 152; see also S. REP. NO. 100-19 at 8

(discussing Congress’ reasoning for closing the nonbank bank
loophole).
130

Contra Omarova, supra note 8, at 152 n.146.

131

See, e.g., id. (discussing the implications of access to

deposit insurance for commercial businesses who partner with
depository institutions).
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010:
firms that are too big to fail.132

safeguarding

Dodd-Frank revolutionized

financial stability regulation with the creation of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), whose ability to
designate nonbank systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFIs”) gives the Board power that never existed under the
BHCA; that is, oversight over nonbank institutions—institutions
with no banking subsidiaries—such as insurance companies.133
Under Dodd-Frank, firms designated as SIFIs by FSOC are subject
to enhanced regulation by the Board and must maintain certain
capital thresholds, among other requirements.134

While the FSOC

regime is separate and apart from the BHCA, it adopts a similar

132

See id. at 191 (noting how the Dodd-Frank financial stability

regime functions as a backstop to the BHCA for firms not covered
under the statute).
133

See id. at 127 (explaining Dodd-Frank’s applicability to

firms designated as SIFIs, even ones that do not own a bank, and
how they would become subject to supervision and regulation by
the Board much like BHCs).
134

Id.
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framework and applies it to firms designated as SIFIs.135

It is

notable that Congress viewed safeguarding too-big-to-fail
financial conglomerates as a key policy objective underlying a
BHCA-like regulatory regime.136
The concept behind the FSOC designation process was that
financial firms could become so large that they pose a systemic
risk to the entire financial system such that their failure is
not an option (thus the moniker “too-big-to-fail”).137

FSOC

initially showed promise, with some legal scholars positing that
the new financial stability regime would make a strong BHCA less
necessary.138

135

In other words, a BHC that is not subject to the

See id. (contending that Dodd-Frank essentially adopted the

BHCA regulatory regime and applied it to firms designated as
SIFIs).
136

See id. (noting the financial crisis made the once “obsolete”

BHCA relevant again).
137

See DAVID W. PERKINS

POLICY ISSUES

IN THE

ET AL.,

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45518, BANKING

116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019) (discussing the concept

of too-big-to-fail, stemming from the financial crisis of 20072009).
138

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 191 (arguing that the debate

over the BHCA’s applicability will be much less vital following

45

BHCA due to the fact that it controls an exempt entity could
still be subject to oversight by the Board if it is designated
as a SIFI.139

Others questioned the effectiveness of Dodd-

Frank’s solution for resolving too-big-to-fail institutions.140
At any rate, Dodd-Frank’s financial stability regime has since
been rolled back.

The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and

Consumer Protection Act of 2018 raised the threshold for SIFI

Dodd-Frank and pointing out that the FSOC regime can also serve
the same policy rationales that underlie the BHCA).
139

See id. (making the point that a company not covered by the

BHCA could still be subject to supervision by the Board in a
BHCA-like manner under Dodd-Frank).
140

See generally Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial

Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO STATE
L.J. 1087 (2015) (discussing the risks and inadequacies of an ex
post approach to financial stability and financial crises,
criticizing Dodd-Frank and FSOC); see generally Arthur E.
Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act:

A Flawed and Inadequate Response

to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011)
(discussing the shortcomings of Dodd-Frank’s approach to toobig-to-fail and the SIFI designation process).
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designation to from $50 billion to $250 billion in assets. 141
Additionally, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced
changes to FSOC’s designation guidelines that would make it
harder to designate too-big-to-fail institutions as SIFIs.142
Accepting the premise that FSOC would serve to complement the
BHCA—and recognizing that there are no presently designated
SIFIs—it appears that the BHCA will have to assume the role of
safeguarding too-big-to-fail institutions going forward.143

141

See Thomas W. Joo, Lehman 10 Years Later:

The Dodd-Frank

Rollback, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 568 (2019) (discussing the
changes that the 2018 legislation made to Dodd-Frank and FSOC’s
SIFI designation process).
142

See John W. Banes et al., FSOC Shift to an Activities-Based

Approach Signals an Emphasis on the Risks to Financial Stability
from Digital Transformation, DAVIS POLK (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2020-0115_fsoc_shift_to_activitiesbased_approach_signals_emphasis_on_risks_from_digital_transforma
tion.pdf (summarizing the changes to the SIFI designation
process under the 2019 guidance).
143

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 191 (discussing the potential

for FSOC to fill the shoes of the BHCA when it comes to too-big-
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B.

Applying the Framework:

Marketplace Lending

Having established a framework by which to analyze whether
marketplace lenders should qualify as banks under the BHCA, we
can now apply that framework to our hypothetical marketplace
lender, FastCash.

The first rationale—restricting interstate

banking—has faded away from the BHCA’s focus.144

Nonetheless,

even if we were to consider whether defining FastCash as a bank
under the BHCA would serve this rationale, FastCash offers
lending services to its customers via an online platform only
and does not have any branch locations.145

Even if Congress

retained restricting interstate banking as a key policy

to-fail institutions); see also John Heltman, Prudential, the
Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018,
9:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-thelast-nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label (reporting on FSOC’s
designation to remove Prudential’s SIFI designation, which was
the last remaining SIFI).
144

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 122–23 (“[S]afeguarding

interstate banking restrictions faded away as the primary policy
purpose behind the BHCA.”).
145

See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 14, at 1 (describing

marketplace lenders as online entities that do not provide
services via a physical location).
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objective for the BHCA, applying the definition of a bank to
FastCash would not serve this rationale.146
The second rationale, preventing the monopolization of
commercial credit, stemmed from concerns by community bankers
that they would be pushed out of the market by larger banking
entities.147

While it remains a valid policy goal for the BHCA,

the reality of the financial industry is that most banks have
consolidated to form large financial conglomerates, hoarding a
significant percentage of the commercial credit market. 148

At

any rate, our hypothetical marketplace lender FastCash makes
consumer loans only, and the concentration of consumer credit

146

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 122 (explaining that the

restrictions in the BHCA against interstate banking arose as a
result of banks forming BHC to avoid state laws in interstate
branching).
147

See id. (characterizing small independent and community

bankers as the main thrust behind the BHCA due to fears of being
overrun by large interstate banks).
148

See id. at 124 (describing the allocation of commercial

credit among large financial institutions versus small and
medium-sized banks).
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was not an issue that Congress was concerned about.149

But, say

for example that FastCash wanted to expand into small business
lending.150

FastCash’s share of the small business lending

market would likely be relatively minor compared to the total
amount of commercial credit.151

However, small business credit

origination by marketplace lenders is growing rapidly, and there
is reason to assume that FastCash will be competitive with other
commercial lenders in the future.152

Additionally, it is likely

that Abracadabra’s acquisition of FastCash could pose a risk to
the concentration of commercial credit given that Abracadabra, a
large e-commerce technology company, holds a substantial share

149

See id. at 148 (explaining Congress’ focus on commercial

loans as opposed to consumer loans).
150

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the commercial

lending activities of marketplace lenders).
151

See id. (providing statistics on marketplace lenders’

consumer and small business credit, noting that marketplace
lenders “accounted for less than 1% of the total consumer and
small-business loan market”).
152

See id. (emphasizing that marketplace lending is growing at a

fast pace and noting the industry saw an increase of 163% in
credit originations between 2011 and 2015).
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of the market in the retail industry and thus has a large
customer base.153
We now turn to the question of whether defining FastCash as
a bank under the BHCA would serve the separation of banking and
commerce.154

The first prong of this rationale pertains to

safety and soundness, specifically whether FastCash, as a
national SPNB, is “too vital to be subject to the risks of other
business activities.”155

It is unlikely that a small lender such

as FastCash, even if acquired by a larger company like
Abracadabra, would face systemic risks due to Abracadbra’s
nonbanking businesses.156

However, Abracadabra’s use of big data

could pose problems that might affect both its retail customers

153

See, e.g. Khan, supra note 79, at 795 (analogizing the risks

posed by Amazon in the antitrust sense to the intermingling of
banking and commerce).
154

See Omarova, supra note 7, at 123–24 (discussing the

separation of banking and commerce).
155

Khan, supra note 79, at 795.

156

See id. at 795–96 (suggesting that Amazon’s expansion into

financial services is unlikely to pose excessive financial
risks).
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and lending customers.157

Therefore, it would seem defining

FastCash as a bank under the BHCA would serve the safety and
soundness prong.

The second prong pertains to bias in credit

underwriting, particularly whether FastCash would be more
inclined to lend to Abracadabra to prop-up its failing
nonbanking businesses.158

It would be very difficult to predict

whether FastCash would be a good actor and conduct transactions
with its affiliates at arms-length, but it is safe to assume
that bias is a possibility.159

Lastly, the third prong relates

to the potential for Abracadabra to form a large financial
conglomerate.160

157

This is similarly difficult to predict but,

See id. at 796 (using the 2013 Target hack as an example of

the threat that large retailers pose because of their access to
scores of consumer data).
158

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276 (discussing bias as an

issue with failing to separate banking and commerce).
159

See Khan, supra note 79, at 795 (“Allowing a vertically

integrated dominant platform [such as Amazon] to pick and choose
to whom it makes its services available, and on what terms, has
the potential to distort fair competition and the economy as a
whole.”).
160

See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276–77 (examining the risks of

an excessive concentration of economic power).
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nonetheless, a possibility.161

Along the same line, however, it

is important to note the growing trend among Big Tech companies
to expand into financial services.162

The “Big Four”—Google,

Amazon, Facebook, and Apple—hold a large share of the market and
thus have a large consumer base.163

Even though it is unclear

whether this prong is satisfied, there is a sufficient
possibility that the acquisition of marketplace lenders will
form large financial conglomerates that subjecting FastCash to

161

See Khan, supra note 79, at 796–97 (using Amazon as an

example to suggest that allowing such companies to combine
various lines of business could create an excessive
concentration of economic power).
162

See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Big Tech’s Invasion of Banking, MILKEN

INST. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/bigtechs-invasion-of-banking (noting that commercial firms, such as
“Amazon, Google, Alibaba and Tencent,” are entering the
financial services world, threatening antitrust principles and
the separation of banking and commerce, particularly because
these companies have a large cache of resources and data).
163

See id. (“[I]n light of its deep pockets and unprecedented

access to data, big tech could prove the greater threat.”).
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the definition of bank would seem to serve all three prongs and,
therefore, the separation of banking and commerce. 164
Having discussed the explicit policy rationales, there
appears to be a case for subjecting FastCash to the definition
of a bank under the BHCA.165

There remain, however, the proposed

implicit rationales, which might shed further light on whether
FastCash should be a “bank.”166

164

The first implicit rationale is

See Khan, supra note 79, at 796–97 (discussing the risks of

consolidating economic power).
165

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 119 (emphasizing the relevance

of the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales); see also id. at 120
(stating that the BHCA’s policy rationales have evolved over
time as a result of changing conditions); see also id.
(reiterating restricting interstate banking and the excessive
concentration of commercial credit as underlying policy
rationales for the BHCA).
166

See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); see also id. at

151–52 (pointing out that commercial companies who acquire banks
also acquire cheap funding backed by depositors); see also id.
at 127 (discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, nonbank systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) are regulated
similarly to BHCs).
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the existence, or lack thereof, of a parallel regulatory
regime.167

The credit union and thrift exemptions to the

statutory definition of a bank were justified on the basis that
credit unions were already regulated by the NCUA, while thrifts
were already regulated by OTS, and subsequently the OCC. 168

With

marketplace lenders, there is no parallel regulatory regime at
the national level.169 Marketplace lenders are primarily
regulated by the states and may be regulated by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to the extent that consumer
protection statutes are implicated.170

167

This tilts the balance in

See id. at 178 (existence of a parallel regulatory regime for

thrifts); see also id. at 190 (existence of a parallel
regulatory regime for credit unions).
168

See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the

regulatory regime for thrifts by dissolving OTS and transferring
authority to the OCC).
169

See Perkins, supra note 14, at 12 (outlining the regulatory

framework for the marketplace lending industry).
170

See id. at 14–15 (discussing the consumer protection statutes

that apply to marketplace lending).
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favor of including marketplace lenders in the statutory
definition of a bank.171
However, recall that our hypothetical marketplace lender
FastCash has received an SPNB charter from the OCC.172
Therefore, a parallel regulatory regime would exist for FastCash
at the federal level, but this is hardly dispositive.173

If

being subject to regulation by the OCC weighed against BHCA
applicability, then there would be no BHCA to begin with.

This

is because the OCC has primary regulatory authority for all
chartered national banks.174

The fact that FastCash as a SPNB

would be regulated by the primary federal banking regulator does

171

See id. at 16–17 (discussing the burdensome state regulatory

system and lack of a national regulatory regime for marketplace
lenders).
172

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 4

(discussing how FinTech SPNBs would be regulated by the OCC as
national banks).
173

See id. at 6 (“The OCC is the primary prudential regulator

and supervisor of national banks.”).
174

Id.
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not mean that the BHCA should not apply.175

As a result,

analyzing the parallel regulatory structure suggests that
FastCash should be subject to the statutory definition of a
bank.176
The next implicit policy rationale pertains to whether
FastCash has access to the federal safety net; specifically,
whether Abracadabra would have access to funding subsidized by
the public, obtaining an unfair competitive advantage.177

175

This

See id. at 7 (acknowledging that national banks could be

subject to regulation under the BHCA if the bank meets the
statutory definition).
176

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 186 n.327 (citing H.R. 10 - The

Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 Hearings before the
Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 106th Cong. 42-43 (1999)
(statement of R. Scott Jones, President, American Bankers
Association)) (noting thrift and bank holding companies are
regulated differently, which is why the fact that a parallel
regulatory system exists for thrifts was relevant to Congress’
decision to exempt thrifts from the definition of a bank under
the BHCA).
177

See id. at 152 (explaining that the issue with nonbank banks

was there access to the federal safety net, giving them an
unfair competitive advantage).
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rationale need not be discussed further because subjecting
FastCash to the BHCA clearly would not serve to protect the
federal safety net.178

FastCash does not engage in any deposit-

taking business nor would it be able to because FinTech SPNBs
are not permitted to take deposits.179

Without any insured

deposits, FastCash and its acquisition by Abracadabra pose no
threat to the federal safety net.180
There appears to be a case in favor of subjecting FastCash
to the statutory definition of a bank as doing so would serve
the following three rationales:

(1) preventing the

monopolization of commercial credit; (2) separation of banking
and commerce; and (3) availability of a parallel regulatory
regime.

178

The last rationale to consider is whether applying the

See id. at 150 (noting that nonbank banks accepted insured

deposits, which served as the exposure of risk to the federal
safety net).
179

See OFFICE

OF THE

COMPTROLLER

OF THE

CURRENCY, supra note 2

(prohibiting depository institutions from applying for the
FinTech charter).
180

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 152 (pointing out that deposits

serve as cheap source of funding because they are insured and
backed by federal dollars).
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statutory definition of a bank to FastCash would safeguard
FastCash and its parent company as too-big-too-fail.181
Because it is near impossible to predict with certainty
whether Abracadabra will become too-big-to-fail, the primary
argument weighing in favor of defining FastCash as a bank under
the BHCA is the fact that the Dodd-Frank regime is no longer a
fallback.182

In Dodd-Frank, Congress created FSOC with the

intention of regulating large firms posing a systemic financial
risk to the markets.183

Initially, it was unclear how effective

FSOC would be, but it was expected that the exemptions from the
BHCA definition of a bank would become less important in favor

181

See id. at 191 (discussing the relevance of the FSOC regime

to the BHCA).
182

See Joo, supra note 141, at 568 (detailing how the Dodd-Frank

regulatory regime and SIFI designation process have been rolled
back under the Trump Administration); see also Banes, supra note
142 (describing how the FSOC designation process has changed
pursuant to the 2019 guidance).
183

See Omarova, supra note 8, at 129 (discussing the BHCA-like

regulatory regime that was enacted following the financial
crisis).
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of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.184

Because that has not

happened, and the future of the Dodd-Frank regime remains
uncertain, this weighs in favor of applying the statutory
definition of a bank to FastCash and subjecting Abracadabra to
the enhanced regulations of the BHCA. 185
IV.

Recommendations for Applying the BHCA to FinTech SPNBs
Given that the BHCA does not currently apply to FinTech

SPNBs and having concluded that it should, this comment

184

See id. (noting that the success of Dodd-Frank’s changes on

financial stability and the regulation of too-big-to-fail
institutions had not yet come to fruition); see also id. at 191
(arguing that the distinctions in the definition of a bank under
the BHCA matter less following the passage of Dodd-Frank because
this new systemic regulatory regime was serving the same
rationales underlying the BHCA but with broader applicability).
185

See id. at 191 (suggesting that the Dodd-Frank regulatory

regime might make it less likely that companies will try to
avoid triggering the BHCA because of FSOC’s designation
authority).

But see Complaint at 1, Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18

Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019)
(cautioning against enabling companies to obtain the benefits of
a national bank charter because it would make them more likely
to be too-big-to-fail).
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recommends that Congress amend Section 2(c) of the BHCA to
include FinTech SPNBs in the definition of a bank.186

Firstly,

it must be noted that the OCC FinTech charter is still being
litigated, and no FinTech company has yet applied for the
charter.187

There are two ways by which the FinTech charter can

become a legal certainty.

On the one hand, the Second Circuit

could uphold the OCC’s authority to charter FinTech SPNBs, in
which case, the charter proposal would move forward. 188

186

On the

See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (setting out the seminal

definition of a bank under the BHCA).
187

Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL

6334895, at *1; see also Lacewell v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2d Cir.
filed Dec. 19, 2019); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Lacewell, No. 18
Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (noting that the OCC has not
yet received any applications for a FinTech charter).
188

See Glenn G. Lammi, State vs. Federal Clash Over National

“Fintech Charter” Set For 2020 Appellate Showdown?, FORBES (Nov.
14, 2019, 1:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2019/11/14/state-vs-federalclash-over-national-fintech-charter-set-for-2020-appellateshowdown/#34e43868757d (contending that the Second Circuit could
uphold the OCC FinTech charter).
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other hand, Congress could amend the National Bank Act and give
the OCC the specific authority to charter FinTech SPNBs, similar
to what it has done in the past for trust banks and bankers’
banks.189

Alternatively, however, it is possible that the OCC

neither wins the Second Circuit case nor receives authority from
Congress to charter FinTech SPNBs, and the potential for a
FinTech national bank disappears for the time being.190
Assuming the OCC’s ability to charter FinTech companies as
national banks is valid, Congress should amend the BHCA in
accordance with previous iterations to include FinTech SPNBs in
the statutory definition of a bank.191

In 1982, Congress enacted

the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, which provides

189

See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (2018) (giving the OCC the authority to

charter trust banks and bankers’ banks).
190

See Sarah Grotta, Is This the End for the OCC Fintech

Charter?, PAYMENTSJOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.paymentsjournal.com/is-this-the-end-for-the-occfintech-charter/ (reporting on the OCC FinTech charter
litigation).
191

See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub.

L. No. 97–320, § 404, 96 Stat. 1496, 1511–12 (codified as
amended in sections of 12 U.S.C.) (subjecting bankers’ banks to
the definition of a bank under the BHCA).
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a framework that Congress can replicate to apply the BHCA
definition of a bank to FinTech SPNBs. 192

Title IV of the Garn-

St Germain Act introduced the concept of “bankers’ banks,” that
is, banks that are owned “exclusively . . . by other depository
institutions” and are engaged in “providing services for other
depository institutions and their officers, directors, and
employees.”193

Under the 1970 version of the BHCA, bankers’

banks did not meet the statutory definition of a bank.194
Consequently, in the Garn-St Germain Act, Congress amended the
BHCA to provide that:
The term ‘bank’ also includes a State chartered bank
or a national banking association which is owned
exclusively (except to the extent directors’
qualifying shares are required by law) by other
depository institutions or by a bank holding company
which is owned exclusively by other depository
institutions and is organized to engage exclusively in

192

Id.

193

See id. (giving the OCC the authority to charter bankers’

banks and amended the BHCA to include bankers’ banks in the
definition of a bank); 12 U.S.C. § 27 (2018) (codifying the
OCC’s authority charter bankers’ banks and defining a bankers’
bank).
194

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970).
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providing services for other depository institutions
and their officers, directors, and employees. 195
While this provision has been effectively repealed because
it is no longer necessary under the 1987 statutory definition of
a bank, the Garn-St Germain Act provides a useful roadmap for
how Congress can close the BHCA loophole in the OCC FinTech
charter.196

This comment recommends that Congress append a

subsection to Section 2(c)(1) of the BHCA providing that the
term “bank” also includes institutions chartered as SPNBs
pursuant to the OCC FinTech charter. 197
The Garn-St Germain Act also exempted bankers’ banks from
the requirement that every bank subsidiary of a holding company
be an insured bank as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (“FDIA”).198

With FinTech SPNBs who, by definition, do not

and cannot take deposits, the Garn-St Germain Act appears to be

195

§ 404(d), 96 Stat. 1512.

196

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–86,

§ 101, 101 Stat. 552, 554–564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841);
U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018).
197

See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (containing the statutory

definition of a bank under the BHCA).
198

§ 404(d)(2), 96 Stat. 1512 (exempting bankers’ banks from

BHCA deposit insurance requirements).
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the optimal model for Congress to subject companies with control
over FinTech SPNBs to the requirements of the BCHA without also
implicating the requirements for deposit insurance.199
V.

Conclusion
As Big Tech makes its way into financial services, U.S.

regulators will need to grapple with the reality that the
current legal framework is ill-equipped to deal with this entry.
This comment proposes an analysis framework that is flexible and
will necessarily evolve over time in order to determine whether
an entity should be subject to the requirements of the BHCA.

An

analysis of the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales reveals that
marketplace lenders should be included in the statutory
definition of a bank.

Congress can do this by amending the

definition under Section 2(c) of the BHCA to include SPNBs
chartered pursuant to the OCC FinTech charter.

Doing so would

ensure that Big Tech companies and others could not use the
charter as a form of regulatory arbitrage by circumventing the
enhanced requirements under the BHCA.

199

See § 404, 96 Stat. 1512 (amending the BHCA with respect to

bankers’ banks).

65

